departure from the participants' everyday experience and the closest approximation to what theorists of "deliberative democracy" have in mind.
This study reports on the first Deliberative Poll designed to estimate the specific contribution of the formal on-site deliberation. In an enfolded randomized experiment, the participants are randomly assigned to deliberate one or the other of two distinct policy issues, then answer the same questions as when first interviewed and recruited, then deliberate the other issue, then answer the same questions again. The midterm measurement-at the point at which the participants have had the same treatment, except for deliberating one issue versus the otheris particularly revealing. To the extent that it is the on-site deliberation that is producing the overall change, the attitude change and approach to single-peakedness should be greater, on each issue, among those who have just finished deliberating that issue than among those who have just finished deliberating the other issue.
Our results show some interesting differences between the two issues. Both show the usual Deliberative Polling effects, but in one case the effects are stronger and seem to stem much more from the on-site deliberation than in the other. Thus we conclude by considering how deliberation's effects may vary with the issue. We suggest that deliberation's effects are apt to be stronger on less salient issues.
Deliberative Democracy and Deliberative Polling
Democracy, according to deliberative democrats, should not just aggregate preferences but help shape them. Votes and opinions should emerge from processes of discussion and reflection (Elster 1998). The attainability of this ideal is unclear. The public may never achieve much more than the modest and imperfect deliberation that already occurs. Competing demands for time and attention, coupled with typically minuscule probabilities of actually affecting the outcome, may make ignorance too rational (Downs 1957) . But while it may not be possible to get everyone to discuss and reflect seriously on policy issues, it is possible to get random samples of a few hundred to do so. The resulting distributions of policy and electoral preferences provide glimpses of what the whole public would think if it deliberated to the same degree. That is the strategy of Deliberative Polling.
The basics of the design are these: A random sample is drawn, interviewed, and invited to attend a weekend of deliberations at a common site. Those agreeing to attend are sent carefully balanced briefing materials laying out the major arguments for and against the major policy proposals. On-site, they discuss the issues in randomly assigned small groups led by trained moderators and question balanced panels of competing experts or policy-makers in plenary sessions. Then, at the end, they answer the same questions as at the beginning. They receive a financial inducement for participating, and the deliberations are generally televised.
The intent is to approach a counterfactual ideal in which deliberation is not only more pervasive but in several important senses "better"-more substantive, better informed, more balanced, more deeply reflective, and more inclusive in the sense of involving more sociodemographically and attitudinally diverse discussants. The briefing materials are provided to jump start the participants' learning and thinking about the issues. The briefing materials and expert panels are carefully balanced, and the small group moderators strive to ensure that all the arguments in the briefing materials get considered. The participants read, hear, and voice arguments and counter-arguments. The moderators keep the discussions on-topic and civil. The combination of random sampling and random assignment maximizes the heterogeneity of both the attitudes expressed and the people expressing them.
These features make the formal on-site deliberations very different from naturally occurring discussion in the real world-much closer to what those writing of "deliberative democracy" have in mind. The participants talk with people very unlike themselves, expressing views very unlike their own, and in circumstances in which it is difficult not to give them and their views serious attention. We suspect that these artificial-more ideal-features give the deliberation in Deliberative Polling much of its effect.
Deliberation, Policy Attitudes, and Proximity to Single-Peakedness
But let us say a bit more about the effects we are looking for, why we expect them, and why they matter. Our first hypothesis, again, is that deliberation frequently changes policy attitudes, both individually and in the aggregate, although the degree and direction of change will naturally depend on the nature of the issue and the circumstances of the day. (For some speculations, see Luskin 2003.) One possible mechanism is that the participants come to draw truer, tauter connections between their policy attitudes and their own more fundamental values and interests. Another is that they come to redefine their interests or re-weight their values. In particular, we suspect that they sometimes gravitate toward thinking in terms of a wider public interest. 5 In either case, we should expect change. Of course the individual-level changes may largely cancel out, with some participants moving one way, and others moving equally the other way. There could be much gross but little net change. But absent any reason to expect such balancing to be the rule-and if anything there is reason to suspect the contrary, given some correlation between interests and initial thought and information-we may expect net change to be quite common (as the evidence from previous Deliberative Polls, reported, e.g. in Fishkin and Jowell 2002, confirms) .
Our second hypothesis-that deliberation tends to increase what we shall call "proximity to single-peakedness"-needs more explanation. A combination of preferences is single-peaked across individuals if the alternatives can be aligned on some dimension, say from left to right, such that every individual has a most preferred alternative and a decreasing preference for other alternatives as they get more distant in either direction from it. This is single-peakedness as originally defined by Black (1948) and Arrow (1951)-sometimes also called "ordinal," as distinct from "spatial" or "cardinal" single-peakedness in the spatial voting model. Single-peakedness matters because it affords an escape from the possibility of cyclical collective preferences in pairwise majority voting, as in Condorcet's paradox (1785). If one third of an electorate prefer x to y to z, another third prefer y to z to x, and the remaining third prefer z to x to y, two-to-one majorities prefer x to y, y to z, and z to x. The winning alternative depends on the pair of alternatives put forward. Such "majority cycles" and their numerous generalizations (e.g., Arrow 1953 , McKelvey 1979 undermine the meaningfulness of majority rule (Riker 1982) . But single-peakedness precludes cycling (Black 1948) , ensuring a Condorcet winner (an alternative that beats, or is tied with, all others in pairwise majority voting).
Note that single-peakedness is a binary property: a combination of preferences is either single-peaked, or it isn't. In populations (or samples) of any size, it is exceedingly unlikely ever to obtain. Following List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean (2006) , we therefore define proximity to single-peakedness, a non-binary property, as S = m/n, where m is the size of a largest subset of sample members whose combination of preferences is single-peaked and n is the overall sample size (m ≤ n). 7 If there were a dimension on which everyone's preferences were single-peaked, m would equal n, and S would equal 1. 8 Proximity to single-peakedness bears a strong positive relationship to the probability that a Condorcet winner exists and a strong negative relationship to the probability of cycles (Niemi 1969 ). 9 Deliberation, we argue, should increase proximity to single-peakedness (see Miller 1992 , Knight and Johnson 1994 , Dryzek and List 2003 , List 2002 , List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean 2006 At the beginning of the weekend, the participants were randomly assigned to one of sixteen small groups, and the small groups in turn randomly assigned to one of the two possible orders in which the two issues could be deliberated. Eight groups (containing 64 participants) deliberated the airport Saturday morning and revenue-sharing Saturday afternoon, the other eight (containing 68 participants) the reverse. We denote these two treatment groups as "A-first" and "R-first," respectively. 13 The formal on-site deliberations consisted of three "deliberative sessions," each involving both small-group discussions and plenary questions-and-answers with panels of policy experts and advocates. The first two sessions, occupying the whole of Saturday, concentrated on one issue apiece, with the first confined to the airport for the A-first treatment group and to revenuesharing for the R-first treatment group, and the second to revenue-sharing for the A-first group and to the airport for the R-first group. 14 The third, on Sunday morning, was more synoptic, with all the participants revisiting both issues in their small groups and then questioning a panel of local and state officials about both.
There were three waves of measurement: the initial telephone interview (T1), a written version of the same questionnaire after the first deliberative session (T2), and the same written version (plus a few additional questions) again at the end of the weekend (T3). The T1-T2 interval thus spans both the first deliberative session on-site and the casual, anticipatory learning and deliberation occurring between the first interview at T1 and the beginning of the weekend.
The T2-T3 interval spans the second and third deliberative sessions on-site.
From the standpoint of the randomized experiment, the T2 measurement is particularly revealing. At that point, one treatment group had deliberated the airport but not revenue-sharing, while the other had deliberated revenue-sharing but not the airport. Both groups had had the experience of deliberating in a casual, less balanced way, with relatively homogeneous interlocutors, in the period between the initial interview and their arrival on site. Both had also had the experience of the more formal and balanced deliberation with more heterogeneous interlocutors on site-but on different issues. The randomization provides assurance that they differed minimally in other ways. On each issue, therefore, the contrast between the A-first and R-first T2 attitudes should reflect the effect of the on-site deliberations on that issue.
The T3 measurement can be used similarly, but less certainly, to assess the effects of the second deliberative session, in which the R-first small groups switched to the airport, and the Afirst small groups to revenue-sharing. This comparison is harder to interpret, since by T2 each group had already deliberated the other issue, and the T2-T3 interval bracketed not only the second deliberative session but also the third, during which both issues were deliberated.
Perhaps discussing revenue-sharing is better preparation for discussing the airport than the reverse. Perhaps considering them simultaneously at the end alters the effect of the earlier sequencing. Or perhaps discussing an issue from T1 to T2 continues to have an effect from T2 to T3, even while the other issue is discussed. How far the T3-T2 comparison should be expected to mirror the T2-T1 comparison is therefore unclear.
The questionnaire asked respondents to both rate and rank the main policy alternatives on each issue. For the airport, these were:
A1. "Commercial passenger service to nearby cities should be maintained but not expanded to serve a larger market."
A2. "Commercial passenger service should be expanded to provide more flights to more places."
A3. "Commercial passenger service should be ended, leaving only service for private airplanes."
For short, these alternatives were to maintain, expand, or end the existing service.
For revenue-sharing, the main alternatives were:
R1. "My town should maintain local control over all of its tax revenues from new businesses and industries"
R2. "My town should try for a voluntary agreement with other towns in the region to share some of the tax revenues from new businesses and industries."
R3. "The state should provide incentives for towns in the region to share some tax revenues from new businesses and industries."
R4. "The state should require towns in the region to share some tax revenues from new businesses and industries."
For short, these alternatives were local control, voluntary sharing, state-encouraged sharing, and mandatory sharing. With regard to the expected level of sharing, the two non-mandatory (voluntary and state-encouraged) sharing options lie between local control, on the one side, and mandatory sharing, on the other.
The rating questions asked whether the respondent agreed strongly, agreed somewhat, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed somewhat, or disagreed strongly with each policy option.
The ranking questions asked the respondent which option was his or her first choice, then which was his or her second choice, and then, in the case of revenue-sharing, which was his or her third choice. The lowest-ranked choice can be inferred from the others. We use the rating questions for the analysis of policy attitudes, the ranking questions for the analysis of proximity to singlepeakedness.
Policy Attitudes
As we shall see, the Deliberative Poll moved our participants toward wanting to end rather than expand airport services and toward favoring non-mandatory revenue sharing as opposed to either mandatory sharing or local control. To summarize airport attitudes, we therefore subtracted the expanding from the ending service rating. Scoring both items from 0, for strong disagreement, to 1, for strong agreement, yields a difference that runs from 1 for strong agreement with expanding service and strong disagreement with ending it to -1 for the reverse. To summarize revenue-sharing attitudes we created two companion indices, one pitting the two middle, non-mandatory sharing options against local control, the other pitting them against mandatory sharing. In each case, we averaged the ratings of the two non-mandatory options and subtracted the rating of the alternative. The indices run from 1 for strong agreement with non-mandatory sharing and strong disagreement with mandatory sharing/local control and -1 for the reverse. Table 1 shows the results. From start to finish, the sample preferred expanding airport service to ending it, as indicated by mean differences well above zero. But that attitude faded significantly by the midterm (T2) measurement following the first round of on-site deliberation, resurging only insignificantly thereafter. Over the course of the experiment, the mean decreased from .540 to .434. On revenue sharing, the sample initially preferred local control to nonmandatory sharing and the latter to mandatory sharing, but reversed the first preference and (Table 1 about here) strengthened the second as the experiment proceeded. By the end, they distinctly preferred nonmandatory sharing or to either local control or mandatory sharing. There are significant changes in this direction from both T1 to T2 and T2 to T3. 15 These results are consistent with those of previous Deliberative Polls, which have shown statistically significant net attitude change more often than not.
The present question, however, is the extent to which this sort of change results from the formal on-site deliberations rather than other aspects of the larger treatment. Again, the contrast between the two treatment groups over the T1 to T2 interval is particularly revealing. Consider first revenue-sharing. The mean attitude shifts dramatically from local control toward nonmandatory sharing in the R-first group, discussing the issue during this interval, but scarcely budges in the A-first group, discussing the airport instead. The change is .313 in the A-first group, only -.012 in the R-first. The difference is highly significant (p < .001). When the question is non-mandatory versus mandatory sharing, the comparison is fainter but similar.
From T1 to T2, the R-first group moves twice as far toward non-mandatory sharing, although in this case the change is not quite significant (p = .115) in the R-first group and insignificantly greater in the R-first than the A-first group. In all, these results suggest that the on-site deliberations drove most of the attitude change on revenue sharing.
The T2-T3 comparison reinforces the inference. Here it is the A-first group, now discussing revenue sharing, that moves furthest toward voluntary sharing or incentives. The Rfirst group continues to move in the same direction, perhaps as a delayed effect of their earlier deliberation, but less so. When the question is non-mandatory sharing versus local control, the change is .318 in the A-first group, .090 in the R-first group; when it is non-mandatory versus mandatory sharing, the figures are .221 and .097. In both cases, the difference is highly significant (p < .001, p = .007).
The attitude changes on the airport tell a somewhat different story. In the first place, there is less overall net change, of only .106, compared to .335 and .220 on the two revenuesharing indices. From T1 to T2, both treatment groups shift toward ending service. Here too it is the group discussing the issue that changes noticeably more (.168 versus .085), and the change is significant in the A-first group, discussing the airport (p = .027), but not quite in the R-first group, discussing revenue-sharing (p = .175). The difference, however, is not statistically significant (p = .392), and neither treatment group shows any real change from T2 to T3.
These results may suggest some slight effect of the on-site deliberation, although the effect is much smaller and the suggestion much more diffident than in case of revenue sharing.
The change is larger and more significant from T1 to T2 in the A-first group. On the other hand, the difference between the groups is insignificant. More certainly, the results suggest some effect of the at-home deliberations before the deliberative weekend. That fits with the noticeable and relatively similar changes in both treatment groups from T1 to T2, the interval containing the at-home deliberations, and the absence of change, in either group, from T2 to T3. That appears to be the bulk of the story on this issue. We speculate about the reason for the difference between the two issues below.
Proximity to Single-Peakedness
Our second hypothesis is that deliberation tends to increase proximity to singlepeakedness, defined, as above, as S = m/n. Note that the identity of the dimension on which the numerator is premised may vary with the treatment group, over time, or both. This leaves S's sampling distribution unknown, although its standard error may be bootstrapped. Table 2 shows S and its bootstrapped standard error for both the whole sample and the two treatment groups separately at all three measurements. 16 The results mostly echo those on attitudes. Overall-across the whole sample from T1 to T3-both issues show increased proximity to single-peakedness. The increase is modest (only from .77 to .81) on the airport but (Table 2 about here) dramatic on revenue-sharing (from .52 to .80). On the airport, the increase occurs entirely from T1 to T2 (when S increases from .77 to .84). There is actually a slight recession (from .84 back to .81) from T2 to T3. 17 On revenue-sharing, S increases both from T1 to T2 (when S goes from .52 to .70) and again from T2 to T3 (when S goes from .70 to .80).
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Comparing the treatment groups again suggests that the on-site deliberation had little if any effect on the airport. The changes in S in both treatment groups are minor. On revenuesharing, however, the on-site deliberation appears to have had a profound effect. From T1 to T2, group, then deliberating the airport. From T2 to T3, it increased by .21 in the A-first group but decreased by .02 in the R-first group.
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Absent S's sampling distribution, we refrain from assertions of statistical "significance or "insignificance." The bootstrapped standard errors, moreover, are for S, not for the difference between the values of S at different times, which may be somewhat larger or (less likely) smaller, depending on the sign and magnitude of the covariance. Still, these estimated standard errors make it hard to imagine that the increases in proximity to single-peakedness on revenue-sharing in the R-first group from T1 to T2 and in the A-first group from T2 to T3 and or that the differences between the two groups over each interval are not significant.
Discussion
These results demonstrate experimentally that the formal on-site deliberations at least sometimes account for a substantial portion of the attitude change and increased proximity to single-peakedness produced by Deliberative Polling. This in turn strengthens the inference, based heretofore only on statistical associations with information gains, that these before-after changes are substantially driven by the deliberative content of Deliberative Polling. It also strengthens the logically prior inference, based heretofore on contrasts with quasi control groups and the usual absence of anything noticeable that could account for parallel, contemporaneous changes in the wider public, that the before-after changes are real. At least on some issues, serious, balanced deliberation with diverse conversational partners does seem to produce both net attitude change and increased proximity to single-peakedness.
The results also suggest, however, that these effects may sometimes be rooted elsewhere.
On revenue-sharing, most of the very large effect seems to stem from the on-site deliberation.
But on the airport, most of the more limited effect appears to occur during the anticipatory period between the invitation and the weekend. Some of this off-site effect may stem from isolated perusal of the briefing materials. But some, we suspect much, of it must also stem from the casual and generally imbalanced conversations with friends, family, and coworkers, stirred by the prospect of the deliberative weekend. This off-site effect may therefore also be deliberative.
What accounts for the difference between the airport and revenue-sharing issues? The most obvious and, we should guess, most important factor is their pre-deliberation salience. Hotbutton issues have already received a great deal of attention and real-world deliberation. If the real-world deliberation is sufficiently good, most people may already be near their fullinformation positions; if it is sufficiently faulty, many people may be entrenched far from them.
In either case, there is less room for a Deliberative Poll to have much effect (although, in the latter case, it might, if it lasted far longer than a weekend). Thus previous Deliberative Polls have tended to show smaller net attitude change and smaller increases in proximity to singlepeakedness for more salient issues. The tendency is particularly strong for proximity to singlepeakedness (see List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean 2006) .
In New Haven, the airport was far more salient than revenue-sharing. In the year preceding the Deliberative Poll, the region's most widely circulated daily newspaper mentioned revenue sharing only seven times but ran 74 articles on airport expansion, 13 of them during the two months immediately preceding the Poll (excluding the coverage of the Poll itself). 20 This coverage, along with editorials and letters from citizens, spanned the full range of commonly held views about airport expansion and maintenance. At the time of the first interview, therefore, the public-our participants included-had presumably deliberated more about the airport than about revenue-sharing. Their attitudes were presumably more firmly rooted, their preferences closer to single-peaked. We note in this connection that S is only .52 for revenue-sharing but .77 for the airport 21 and that the overall net attitude change was only .106 on the airport index versus .335 and .220 on the two revenue-sharing indices.
This explanation finds further support in the pattern of factual information gains. At all three measurements, we asked the participants to say (1) whether the region's population was closest to 250,000, 350,000, 550,000, or 750,000; (2) whether its rate of job growth during the 1990s was more than, about the same as, or less than in the rest of the United States; (3) whether the major source of revenue for most of the region's town governments is sales taxes, property taxes, direct state subsidies, or direct federal subsidies; (4) whether New Haven's population increased, decreased, or did not change during the 1990's; (5) whether state law allows communities to share property tax revenues; (6) whether those communities with the most valuable property tend to have the lowest, average, or the highest property tax rates; (7) whether the Federal Aviation Authority classifies the regional airport as a major hub, a medium hub, a minor hub, or not a hub; and (8) whether maintaining the regional airport at its current level of service would require any significant investment. The correct answers are (1) 555,000, (2) less, (3) property taxes, (4) decreased, (5) yes, (6) the lowest, (7) a non-hub, and (8) yes. Items (7) and (8) are specifically relevant to airport expansion, items (5) and (6) specifically relevant to revenue sharing, and items (1) through (4) generally relevant to the politics of the region. Table 3 shows the percentages of the whole sample and of the two treatment groups answering the two airport items, the three revenue sharing items, the three general items, and all eight items correctly at T1, T2, and T3. As in previous Deliberative Polls, the participants (Table 3 about here) absorbed a great deal of factual information. For the whole sample across all eight items, the average percentage answering correctly increased by 22.3%, from 36.8% to 59.1%. The largest gains on this overall measure occur from T1 to T2, doubtless because that is the much longer interval and because it brackets not only the first on-site deliberative session but the receipt of the briefing materials and the anticipatory, off-site deliberations with friends, family, and coworkers.
We present the issue-specific results with some diffidence, since the airport and revenuesharing indices consist of only two items apiece, and any comparison must rest on a rather shaky assumption of equal average difficulty. Still, the differences are generally sizable, and the pattern extremely satisfying. For the whole sample, revenue-sharing information increased by 34.5%, general information by 19.5%, and airport information by only 15.5%. From T1 to T2, both treatment groups gained more information on the issue they deliberated then but also gained on the other issue, undoubtedly because the briefing materials and anticipatory, off-site deliberations covered both issues. The A-first group gained 15.6% on the airport and 6.3% on revenue sharing, while the R-first group gained 40.4% on revenue-sharing and 8.8% on the airport. Both groups also gained, and to similar degree (19.1% and 19.9%), on regional politics more generally. From T2 to T3, however, each treatment group showed significant information gains only on the issue it deliberated during that interval. The A-first group gained 18.8% on revenue sharing, and the R-first group 5.9% on the airport. Between T1 and T2, in short, the participants learn a good deal (presumably before arriving on-site) about all the topics of deliberation and a good deal more (presumably after arriving) about the topic they deliberate during the first deliberative session. Between T2 and T3 they learn still more but only about the topic they deliberate during the second deliberative session. The on-site learning does seem to be deliberation-based.
These information gains line up nicely with the net attitude change and increase in proximity to single-peakedness on revenue-sharing. From T1 to T2, the A-first group learned a good deal about revenue sharing and changed its views a good deal. It also showed a modest increase in proximity to single-peakedness. The R-first group learned still more, changed its views still more, and showed a much greater increase in proximity to single-peakedness. From T2 to T3, the A-first group, then deliberating revenue-sharing, learned a good deal on top of what it had learned from T1 to T2, changed its views a good deal further, and added greatly to its T1-T2 increase in proximity to single-peakedness. The R-first group learned only a little, changed its views only a little, and showed no increase in proximity to single-peakedness.
(Compare Tables 3 with Tables 1 and 2.) This explanation receives additional support from the issue-specific information measures in Table 3 . Again acknowledging that each measure rests on only two items, we note that the participants seem to have been much better informed about the airport than about revenue-sharing at T1, before they had ever heard of the Deliberative Poll, answering 25.4% of the revenue-sharing information items but 38.6% of the airport information items correctly. The revenue sharing information items do not appear simply to have been intrinsically harder, given that by T3 the participants actually fared slightly better on them (59.9% correct, versus 54.2% on the airport items). 22 Rather, the participants would appear to have entered the Deliberative Poll with better informed-and hence less easily changed and more highly structured-preferences about the airport than about revenue sharing.
A broad residual question is how, in two distinct senses, to apportion the on-site deliberation's effect. The first sense is more operational, a matter of disaggregating the Deliberative Polling experience. Recall that each deliberative session consisted of both small-group discussion and plenary questions and answers with panels of policy experts or policy makers. To what extent did the changes result from the one versus the other? Also recall that the T2-T3 interval encompassed two deliberative sessions: the Saturday afternoon session on the second issue (revenue sharing for the A-first group, the airport for the R-first group) and the synoptic Sunday morning session on both issues. To what extent did the T2-T3 changes result from the deliberations on the second issue versus the ensuing deliberations on both issues? Even seemingly small features of the design may have effects worth trying to isolate. The requirement that each small group agree on one or more questions to pose to the expert panels may increase single-peakedness, for example.
The second sense is more theoretical, a matter of distinguishing the social and psychological mechanisms by which deliberation may affect attitudes and proximity to singlepeakedness. How far do the changes stem from the sheer quantity of information acquired, from the degree to which it is balanced, from the social properties or intellectual content of small group discussions, from the attitudinal or socio-demographic heterogeneity of one's fellow discussants? How far do they depend on reading versus listening? On solitary versus social processes more generally? On the adoption of "empirical premises," which are debatable, versus the absorption of "facts," which are not (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002) ? On learning versus thinking? On empathy or identification versus argument? It is already clear, from both earlier statistical analyses (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002) and the experimental results above, that the quantity of factual information absorbed plays a major intervening role, but much more remains to be explored. 23 The answers to these empirical questions bear on more normative ones. To what extent is deliberation subject to the "pathologies" cited by critics of deliberative democracy (Stokes 1998 , Mendelberg 2001 ? To what extent do the substantive focus, balance, and heterogeneity built into the deliberations in Deliberative Polling protect against them?
All these questions need further exploration. We do not wish to anoint any single approach, but further randomized field experiments will help-albeit at some cost in public
consultation. An experimental manipulation that gave different subsets of participants more substantively different experiences, as of discussing different issues or discussing given issues differently, would be exposing only some (if indeed any) of the sample to the optimal treatment.
The n available for estimating deliberative public opinion, as distinct from the effects of variations in the deliberative experience would be radically diminished. The beauty of the splithalf design is that it folds a randomized experiment into a Deliberative Poll without sacrificing the latter's public mission or recommending force. Everyone eventually deliberates both issues.
The only variation is in the timing. But ordinary polls tend to register top-of-the-head, even phantom opinions, and the level of thought and information underlying many votes in elections and referenda is scarcely greater.
Whether from Downsian "rational ignorance" (Downs 1957) or sheer uncalculated obliviousness, not many people know, think, or talk about politics very much (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 , Kinder 1998 , Price 1988 , Luskin 2002 . When they do talk about politics, people tend to choose conversational partners, topics, and specific sources of information to minimize disagreement (Mutz and Martin 2001) . Mostly, therefore, they talk with others very like These results should hearten reformers interested in designing fully democratic, participatory, and effective public consultation (Crosby 1995 , Crosby, Kelly and Shaefer 1986 , Fishkin 1997 , Gastil 2000 , and Leib 2002 ). The results demonstrate the power of even relatively small doses of serious, balanced deliberation with a wide assortment of fellow citizens. More sustained deliberation of this kind can be expected to do still more. T1  T2  T3  T2-T1  T3-T2  T3-T1 A-First (n = 64 policy and electoral preferences (Bartels 1996 , Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996 , Althaus 1997 , Luskin and Globetti 1997 , Gilens 2001 .
3 Admittedly, these comparisons still lack the full authority they would have with true random assignment.
4 Barabas's (2005) analysis of much the same question involves broadly similar quasi control groups analysis (created in his case by matching rather than approximate randomization) but with a highly nonrandom participant sample, hence lesser external validity. 5 To the extent that the first mechanism predominates, we should expect to see attitudes change so as to increase their predictability from sociodemographic variables, proxying interests; to the extent that the second predominates, they should change so as to decrease it Jowell 2002, Luskin 2003) . 7 See also Niemi (1969) . More precisely, let N be the set of n individuals, and X the set of k alternatives. Each individual i∈N holds a preference ordering R i over the alternatives in X which is reflexive, transitive and connected (i.e., it allows strict preferences as well as ties). We write xP i y as an abbreviation for [xR i y and not yR i x]. A combination (n-tuple) of preference orderings 4 for revenue-sharing but only 3 for the airport. See List, Luskin, Fishkin, and McLean (2006) . 22 This does not necessarily mean that there was more learning during the Deliberative Poll about revenue sharing than about airport expansion. Information indices like these are subject to ceiling effects-the participants answering both airport items correctly at T1 could not show any learning, but since great deal of literature in both psychology and communications research argues and finds that the information-rich tend to get information-richer, they were very likely learning a lot, unobservably. Accordingly, there even may have been more learning about the airport than about revenue sharing during the Deliberative Poll. We simply cannot see as much of it. For more extended discussion of this general issue, see Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell (2002) and Luskin (2002) .
